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Abstract—Index coding is concerned with efficient broadcast
of a set of messages to receivers in the presence of receiver side
information. In this paper, we study the secure index coding
problem with security constraints on the receivers themselves.
That is, for each receiver there is a single legitimate message
it needs to decode and a prohibited message list, none of which
should be decoded by that receiver. To this end, our contributions
are threefold. We first introduce a secure linear coding scheme,
which is an extended version of the fractional local partial
clique covering scheme that was originally devised for non-secure
index coding. We then develop two information-theoretic bounds
on the performance of any valid secure index code, namely
secure polymatroidal outer bound (on the capacity region) and
secure maximum acyclic induced subgraph lower bound (on
the broadcast rate). The structure of these bounds leads us to
further develop two necessary conditions for a given index coding
problem to be securely feasible (i.e., to have nonzero rates).
I. INTRODUCTION
Index coding, introduced by Birk and Kol in the context
of satellite communication [1], studies the efficient broadcast
problem where a server broadcasts messages to multiple
receivers via a noiseless channel. Each receiver requests one
unique message and has prior knowledge of some other
messages as its side information. Despite substantial progress
achieved so far (see [2] and the references therein), the index
coding problem remains open in general.
The index coding problem with security constraints was
first studied by Dau et al. in [3], where in addition to the
legitimate receivers there is an eavesdropper who knows some
messages as its side information and wants to obtain any
other message. The server must broadcast in such a way that
the legitimate receivers can decode their requested messages
while the eavesdropper cannot decode any single message
aside from the messages it already knows. Several extensions
have been studied in [4]–[7].
In this work, we consider the index coding problem with
security constraints on the legitimate receivers themselves.
That is, instead of assuming the existence of an eavesdropper,
we impose security requirements on the legitimate receivers,
such that each receiver must decode the legitimate message
it requests and, at the same time, cannot learn any single
message from a certain subset of prohibited messages. Such
communication model has clear applications, e.g., in video
streaming scenarios. While the video streaming provider must
ensure the users can get the movie they have requested and
paid for, it also needs to prevent them from downloading
movies that they have not paid for. A special case of such
model has been studied in [8, Section VI], where the prohib-
ited message set for each receiver includes all the messages
that are neither requested nor known as side information by
the receiver. In the rest of the paper, unless otherwise stated,
we refer to secure index coding as index coding problem with
security constraints on legitimate receivers. Furthermore, the
problem with an eavesdropper is referred to as secure index
coding in the presence of an eavesdropper.
The contribution of this paper are as follows.
1) We introduce a practical linear coding scheme for
secure index coding based on the fractional local partial
clique covering scheme from [9] for non-secure index
coding. We also make use of the existence conditions of
secure index codes for the secure index coding problem
in the presence of an eavesdropper studied in [4].
2) We derive two information-theoretic performance
bounds for the secure index coding problem, which
can be seen as the secure variants of the polymatroidal
bound [10], [11] and the maximum acyclic induced
subgraph (MAIS) bound [12], respectively.
3) We propose two necessary conditions for a given secure
index coding problem to be feasible. This is useful,
because for some secure index coding problems, there
exists no index code that can simultaneously satisfy the
decoding requirement and the security constraints of all
receivers. We say such problems are infeasible.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we
state the problem setup and stipulate system requirements.
In Section III, we propose our secure linear coding scheme
and its corresponding inner bound on the capacity region
of the secure index coding problem. In Section IV, we
develop performance bounds and necessary conditions for the
feasibility of the problem. Concrete examples are provided
in Sections III and IV to show the efficacy of the proposed
techniques. We conclude the paper in Section V.
For non-negative integers a and b, [a]
.
= {1, 2, · · · , a}, and
[a : b]
.
= {a, a+ 1, · · · , b}. If a > b, [a : b] = ∅. For a set S,
|S| denotes its cardinality and 2S denotes its power set.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Assume that there are n messages, xi ∈ {0, 1}ti, i ∈ [n],
where ti is the length of binary message xi. For brevity, when
we say message i, we mean message xi. LetXi be the random
variable corresponding to xi. We assume that X1, . . . , Xn are
independent and uniformly distributed. For any S ⊆ [n], set
Sc
.
= [n] \ S, xS
.
= (xi, i ∈ S), and XS
.
= (Xi, i ∈ S). By
convention, x∅ = X∅ = ∅. Set N
.
= 2[n] denotes the power
set of the message set [n].
A server that contains all messages x[n] is connected to all
receivers via a noiseless broadcast link of normalized capacity
C = 1. Let y be the output of the server, which is a function
of x[n]. There are n receivers, where receiver i ∈ [n] wishes
to obtain xi and knows xAi as side information for some
Ai ⊆ [n] \ {i}. The set of indices of interfering messages at
receiver i is denoted by the set Bi = (Ai ∪ {i})
c.
We assume weak security constraints against the receivers.
That is, for each receiver i ∈ [n], there is a set of messages
Pi ⊆ Bi, which the receiver is prohibited from learning.
More specifically, receiver i should not be able to decode
any information about each individual message j ∈ Pi given
the side information xAi and the received codeword y. A
(t, r) = ((ti, i ∈ [n]), r) secure index code is defined by
• An encoder at the server, φ :
∏
i∈[n]{0, 1}
ti → {0, 1}r,
which maps the messages x[n] to an r-bit sequence y;
• n decoders, one for each receiver i ∈ [n], such that ψi :
{0, 1}r ×
∏
k∈Ai
{0, 1}tk → {0, 1}ti maps the received
sequence y and the side information xAi to xˆi.
We say a rate tupleR = (Ri, i ∈ [n]) is securely achievable
if there exists a (t, r) index code satisfying
Rate: Ri =
ti
r
, ∀i ∈ [n], (1)
Message: H(XS |XS′)
= H(XS) =
∑
i∈S
ti, ∀S, S
′ ∈ N, (2)
Codeword: H(Y ) ≤ r, (3)
Encoding: H(Y |X[n]) = 0, (4)
Decoding: H(Xi |Y,XAi) = 0, ∀i ∈ [n], (5)
Security: I(Xj ;Y |XAi) = 0, ∀j ∈ Pi, i ∈ [n], (6)
where (1) is the definition of Ri, i ∈ [n], (2) follows from the
assumption that the messages are independent and uniformly
distributed, (3) is due to the length of the codeword being r,
(4) follows from that y is a function of x[n], (5) is stipulated
by the decoding requirement at receivers: P{(Xˆ1, . . . , Xˆn) 6=
(X1, . . . , Xn)} = 0, together with Fano’s Inequality, and (6)
is stipulated by the security constraints on the receivers.
The capacity region C of a given secure index coding
problem is the closure of the set of all its securely achievable
rate tuples R. The symmetric capacity is defined as
Csym = max{R : (R, · · · , R) ∈ C }. (7)
The broadcast rate β, which characterizes the minimum
number of the required transmissions from the server to
satisfy the decoding and security constraints for each receiver
when the messages are of the same length, is defined as
β = 1/Csym. (8)
Any secure index coding problem can be represented by
a tuple (A,P) where A
.
= (Ai, i ∈ [n]) and P
.
= (Pi, i ∈
[n]) specify the side information availability and the security
constraints at receivers, respectively. For example, for a three-
message problem with A1 = ∅, A2 = {3}, A3 = {2}, and
P1 = {2, 3}, P2 = P3 = ∅, we write
(A,P) = ((∅, {3}, {2}), ({2, 3}, ∅, ∅)). (9)
Given a secure index coding problem (A,P), its non-secure
counterpart with the same A and no security constraints can
be denoted as (A, (∅, · · · , ∅)), or simply as A.
Any n-message non-secure index coding problem can be
equivalently represented by its side information graph G with
n vertices, in which vertex i ∈ [n] represents message i and a
directed edge (i, j) means that i ∈ Aj . Therefore, any secure
index coding problem (A,P) can also be represented by the
tuple (G,P), where G represents the side information graph
corresponding to A. For a given G, for any set S ∈ N , G|S
denotes the subproblem/subgraph of G induced by S.
We denote the capacity region and the broadcast rate of the
problem (G,P) as C (G,P) and β(G,P), respectively, when
such dependence is to be emphasized.
III. A SECURE LINEAR CODING SCHEME
In this section, we extend the fractional local partial clique
covering (FLPCC) coding scheme from [9] to the secure index
coding problem. First, we briefly review the results from [9].
For a given non-secure index coding problem G define κ(G)
.
=
n−mini∈[n] |Ai|, which denotes the number of parity symbols
to be transmitted if one applies a maximum distance separable
(MDS) code to the problem. Subsequently, for any J ∈ N and
its induced subproblem G|J , κ(G|J ) = |J |−mini∈J |Ai∩J |.
The FLPCC scheme applies time sharing among a number
of subproblems G|J for some J ∈ N , where each subproblem
G|J is assigned with a certain fraction of the unit channel
capacity λJ . Any message xi that appears in multiple sub-
problems is split into sub-messages xi,J , J ∈ {J ∈ N :
i ∈ J, λJ > 0}, and for each subproblem G|J , a systematic
(|J |+κ(G|J ), |J |) MDS code is used such that every receiver
i ∈ J can decode sub-message xi,J at rate
λJ
κ(G|J )
. Moreover,
an MDS code is applied at the subproblem level to the MDS
parity symbols for subproblems, as each receiver can recover
some parity symbols from its side information. In this way,
the channel capcity is shared only among the parity symbols
not available locally at each receiver.
The following theorem presents the inner bound on the
capcacity region given by the FLPCC scheme.
Proposition 1 (Arbabjolfaei and Kim [9]): Consider a given
non-secure index coding problem G. Its capacity region C (G)
is inner bounded by the rate region RFLPCC(G) that consists
of all rate tuples R = (Ri, i ∈ [n]) such that
Ri ≤
∑
J∈N :i∈J
λJ
κ(G|J )
, (10)
for some λJ , J ∈ N satisfying that
λJ ∈ [0, 1], ∀J ∈ N, (11)∑
J∈N :J 6⊆Ai
λJ ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ [n]. (12)
Now we describe our extended secure fractional local
partial clique covering (S-FLPCC) scheme for the secure
index coding problem (G,P). The S-FLPCC scheme still
utilizes time sharing and rate splitting among a number of
subproblems of G and applies an MDS code at the subproblem
level while each subproblem also uses an MDS code. The
main difference with the FLPCC scheme is that for the S-
FLPCC scheme we consider only the subproblems that satisfy
relevant security constraints.
More specifically, for each subproblem G|J assigned with a
nonzero fraction of the channel capacity 0 < λJ ≤ 1, we use
a systematic (|J | + κ(G|J ), |J |) MDS code such that every
receiver i ∈ J can decode sub-message xi,J of rate
λJ
κ(G|J )
.
For each subproblem G|J , due to the nature of MDS codes,
every receiver i ∈ J will be able to decode all the sub-
messages in J of rate λJ
κ(G|J )
from the corresponding parity
symbols. Hence, we require that J ∩Pi = ∅, since otherwise
receiver i will be able to obtain some information about the
messages in J ∩Pi, which violates the security constraint (6).
On the other hand, any receiver i /∈ J acts like an
eavesdropper to the subproblem G|J if J ∩ Pi 6= ∅. It has
been shown in [4] that for G|J there exists some systematic
(|J | + κ(G|J ), |J |) MDS code over a large enough finite
field that is secure against an eavesdropper who knows up
to |J | − κ(G|J ) messages within G|J as its side information
(see [4, Theorem 1] and its proof for more details). Therefore,
to make sure that receiver i /∈ J with J ∩Pi 6= ∅ cannot learn
any single message from the parity symbols of G|J , we simply
require that |Ai ∩ J | < |J | − κ(G|J ).
Referring to our system model, sub-messages xi,J , J ∈
{J ∈ N : i ∈ J, λJ > 0} are independent of each
other. Hence, by combining parity symbols from different
subproblems a receiver cannot gain any extra information
than considering the parity symbols for each subproblem
separately. Therefore, the general security constraint in (6) can
be satisfied as long as the aforementioned security constraints
for each subproblem are satisfied.
We present the S-FLPCC inner bound on the capacity re-
gion, CS−FLPCC(G,P), achievable by the S-FLPCC scheme.
Proposition 2: Consider a given secure index coding prob-
lem (G,P). Its capacity region C (G,P) is inner bounded
by the rate region RS−FLPCC(G,P) that consists of all rate
tuples R = (Ri, i ∈ [n]) such that
Ri ≤
∑
J∈N :i∈J
λJ
κ(G|J )
, (13)
for some λJ , J ∈ N satisfying
λJ ∈ [0, 1], ∀J ∈ N, (14)∑
J∈N :J 6⊆Ai
λJ ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ [n], (15)
Pi ∩ J = ∅, ∀J ∈ N, λJ > 0, i ∈ J, (16)
Pi ∩ J = ∅ or |Ai ∩ J | < |J | − κ(G|J),
∀J ∈ N, λJ > 0, i /∈ J. (17)
Remark 1: Note that (13)-(15) together form the same
achievable rate region for the FLPCC scheme for non-secure
index coding in Proposition 1. The security constraints against
receivers are enforced by (16) and (17).
The example below shows the efficacy of the S-FLPCC
scheme. For simplicity, we compute the securely achievable
symmetric rate rather than the whole rate region.
Example 1: Consider the following 9-message secure index
coding problem (A,P) with Pi = Bi for any i ∈ [9],( (
{1}c, {2}c, {4, 5, 6, 8, 9}, {5, 6, 7, 8}, {3, 4, 7, 8, 9},
{2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9}, {7}c, {8}c, {9}c
)
,
(
∅, ∅, {1, 2, 7}, {1, 2, 3, 9}, {1, 2, 6}, {1, 8}, ∅, ∅, ∅
) )
.
The symmetric rate R = 14 can be securely achieved
by assigning λJ =
1
4 to the subproblems G|J for J ∈
{{1, 2, 8}, {2, 6, 7, 9}, {3, 9}, {4, 5}}, which is optimal for
this problem (see Example 3 in Section IV for more details).
For each subproblem G|J , we have κ(G|J ) = 1 (i.e., the
induced subgraph G|J is actually a clique). One can check
that the security constraints (16) and (17) are met for each
subproblem. For example, consider J = {2, 6, 7, 9}. For any
i ∈ J , Pi ∩ J = ∅ and thus (16) is satisfied for this J . The
receivers i ∈ Jc = {1, 3, 4, 5, 8} can be divided into two
groups. For i ∈ {1, 8}, we have Pi = ∅ and thus Pi ∩ J = ∅.
For i ∈ {3, 4, 5}, we have |Ai ∩ J | = 2 < |J | − κ(G|J ) = 3.
Therefore, (17) is also satisfied for this J .
IV. PERFORMANCE BOUNDS AND NECESSARY
CONDITIONS FOR FEASIBILITY
In this section, we introduce two performance bounds for
the secure index coding problem, as well as two necessary
conditions for a given problem to be securely feasible.
A. An Outer Bound on the Capacity Region
Theorem 1: Consider a given secure index coding problem
(G,P) with any valid (t, r) secure index code. If a rate tuple
R = (Ri, i ∈ [n]) is securely achievable, then it must satisfy
Ri = g(B ∪ {i})− g(B), ∀B ⊆ Bi, i ∈ [n], (18)
for some set function g(S), S ∈ N , such that
g(∅) = 0, (19)
g([n]) ≤ 1, (20)
g(S) ≤ g(S′), if S ⊆ S′, (21)
g(S ∩ S′) + g(S ∪ S′) ≤ g(S) + g(S′), (22)
g(Bi) = g(Bi \ {j}), ∀j ∈ Pi, i ∈ [n]. (23)
Proof: Define the set function as
g(S)
.
=
1
r
H(Y |XSc), ∀S ∈ N. (24)
Relations (18)-(22) are derived in the same manner as [2,
Section 5.2] according to the system model conditions (1)-
(5). To show (23), for any i ∈ [n], j ∈ Pi, by (2), (5), (24),
as well as the security constraints specified in (6), we have
rg(Bi) = H(Y |XAi∪{i})
= H(Xi |Y,XAi) +H(Y |XAi)−H(Xi |XAi)
= H(Y |XAi)− I(Xj ;Y |XAi)−H(Xi |XAi)
= H(Y |XAi∪{j})−H(Xi |XAi∪{j})
= H(Y |XAi∪{i}∪{j})−H(Xi |Y,XAi∪{j})
= rg(Bi \ {j}), (25)
where the second and the second last equalities are simply
due to the chain rule.
The set function g defined above will play a crucial role in
the results to be developed henceforth. We particularly remark
that in (18), when B = ∅, g(B) = 0, and thus Ri = g({i}).
B. A Partition of the Power Set N and A Necessary Condition
for Feasibility Based on It
The security property (23) enforces the value of the set
function g to be equal for certain arguments. For the toy
example in (9), B1 = P1 = {2, 3}. Thus, by (23), we have
g({2, 3}) = g({2}) = g({3}).
Moreover, combining properties (21) and (22) of g with
(23) may result in g to be equal for even more arguments. In
the above example, since g({2, 3}) = g({2}), by (22) we have
g({1, 2, 3}) ≤ g({1, 2})+g({2, 3})−g({2}) = g({1, 2}), and
by (21) we have g({1, 2, 3}) ≥ g({1, 2}). Thus g({1, 2, 3}) =
g({1, 2}). Similarly, g({1, 2, 3}) = g({1, 3}).
Based on the above ideas, we now formally define a
partition on the set N , namely the g-partition, denoted by
N = {N1, N2, · · · , Nγ}.
Definition 1: Given a secure index coding problem (G,P),
its g-partitionN can be constructed using the following steps:
1) Initialize the partition of N such that for any receiver
i ∈ [n], whose Pi is nonempty, for any T ⊆ Bci , there
exists a message subset N(i, T ) ∈ N as
N(i, T ) = {T ∪Bi \ {j} : j ∈ Pi} ∪ {T ∪Bi}.
All elements S ∈ N that are not in any subset N(i, T )
are placed in Nremaining, i.e.
Nremaining = N \ (∪T⊆Bci ,i∈[n]:Pi 6=∅N(i, T )).
2) As long as there exist two subsets N(i, T ), N(i′, T ′)
such that N(i, T ) ∩ N(i′, T ′) 6= ∅, we merge these
two subsets into one new subset. We keep merging
overlapping subsets until all subsets in N are disjoint,
then we index the elements of N as N1, N2, · · · , Nγ
in an arbitrary order, except for Nγ = Nremaining.
For a given secure index coding problem, its g-partition is
unique. We call any subset within the g-partition except for
the last one a g-subset. The function values for g with argu-
ments from within one g-subset are always equal, enforced
by (21), (22), and (23).
Theorem 2: Consider a given secure index coding problem
(G,P) with g-partitionN = {N1, N2, · · · , Nγ} and any valid
(t, r) secure index code. For any g-subset Nk, k ∈ [γ − 1],
we have
g(S) = g(S′), ∀S, S′ ∈ Nk.
Proof: Since Step 2 in Definition 1 is simply merging
subsets that have at least one common element, it suffices to
show that for the initial partition N in Step 1, for any receiver
i ∈ [n] whose Pi is nonempty, T ⊆ Bci , we have
g(S) = g(S′), ∀S, S′ ∈ N(i, T ), (26)
Consider any receiver i ∈ [n] whose Pi is nonempty, T ⊆
Bci . For any j ∈ Pi, we have
g(T ∪Bi) ≤ g(T ∪Bi \ {j}) + g(Bi)− g(Bi \ {j})
= g(T ∪Bi \ {j}), (27)
where the inequality follows from (22) and the equality
follows from (23). On the other hand, by (21), we have
g(T ∪Bi) ≥ g(T ∪Bi \ {j}). (28)
Combining (27) and (28) yields g(T ∪Bi) = g(T ∪Bi \{j}),
which implies (26).
Let gNk denote the value of g of any set S that belong
to the g-subset Nk, k ∈ [γ − 1], within a given N =
{N1, N2, · · · , Nγ}, i.e., gNk
.
= g(S), ∀S ∈ Nk.
We state our first necessary condition for a given secure
index coding problem to be feasible based on its g-partition.
Theorem 3: Consider a given secure index coding problem
(G,P) with g-partition N = {N1, N2, · · · , Nγ}. For any k ∈
[γ − 1], if there exist some S, S′ ∈ Nk and i ∈ [n] such that
S′ ∪ {i} ⊆ S and S′ ⊆ Bi, then the problem is not feasible.
Proof: Consider any valid (t, r) secure index code and
any securely achievable R. For any k ∈ [γ− 1], suppose that
there exist such S, S′ ∈ Nk and i ∈ [n]. We have
g(S′) = g(S) ≥ g(S′, i) = g(S′) +Ri, (29)
where the first equality follows from Theorem 2 with that
S and S′ belong to the same g-subset Nk. The inequality
follows from that S′ ∪ {i} ⊆ S and (21), and the second
equality follows from (18) with S′ ⊆ Bi. Clearly, (29)
indicates that Ri = 0 and thus the problem is not feasible.
Remark 2: One common scenario where a problem is
infeasible is that there exit two receivers i 6= j ∈ [n] such that
Aj ⊆ Ai∪{i} and j ∈ Pi. For example, see [8, Proposition 2].
In this case, receiver i, after decoding its requested message
i, knows more messages than receiver j and thus can always
mimic the behaviour of receiver j to decode message j. This
violates the security constraint j ∈ Pi and thus, the problem is
infeasible. We can simply show that such scenario is captured
by Theorem 3 as a special case. Since j ∈ Pi ⊆ Bi, there
exists a g-subset Nk for some k ∈ [γ−1] within N such that
S = Bi ∈ Nk and S′ = Bi \ {j} ∈ Nk. First, we have
S′ ∪ {j} = (Bi \ {j}) ∪ {j} = Bi ⊆ Bi = S.
Second, since Aj ⊆ Ai ∪ {I}, we have Bj ∪ {j} = Acj ⊇
(Ai ∪ {i})c = Bi, which together with j ∈ Bi leads to
S′ = Bi \ {j} ⊆ Bj .
Therefore, according to Theorem 3, the problem is infeasible.
Example 2: Consider the following 5-message secure index
coding problem (A,P),
(
({2, 4, 5}, {1, 5}, ∅, {2}, {1, 2}), (∅, {4}, {1, 2, 5}, {1}, ∅)
)
.
By Definition 1, the g-partition of the problem can be written
as N = {N1, · · · , Nγ} where γ = 6, and
N1 = {{3}, {3, 4}}, N2 = {{1, 2, 4, 5} \ {j} : j ∈ {1, 2, 5}},
N3 = {{1, 3}, {1, 3, 4}}, N4 = {{2, 3}, {2, 3, 4}}
N5 = {{1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 3, 4}, {3, 5}, {1, 3, 5}, {2, 3, 5},
{1, 2, 3, 5}, {3, 4, 5}, {1, 3, 4, 5}, {2, 3, 4, 5}, [5]},
and N6 = N \ (∪k∈[5]Nk). Consider {1, 3, 5}, {1, 3, 4, 5} ∈
N5 and 4 ∈ [5], we have {1, 3, 5} ∪ {4} ⊆ {1, 3, 4, 5} and
{1, 3, 5} ⊆ B4. Thus, by Theorem 3 the problem is infeasible.
C. A Lower Bound on the Broadcast Rate and A Necessary
Condition for Feasibility Based on It
First, we briefly review the MAIS bound from [12].
Proposition 3 (Bar-Yossef et al. [12]): Consider a non-
secure index coding problem G. Its broadcast rate β(G) is
lower bounded as
β(G) ≥ βMAIS(G)
.
= max
S∈N :G|S is acyclic
|S |.
We have the following lemma.
Lemma 1: Consider a non-secure index coding problem G
with any valid (t, r) secure index code. For any set S ∈ N
and securely achievable symmetric rate R, we have
g(S) ≥ R · βMAIS(G|S).
Proof: Assume u = βMAIS(G|S). Then there exists some
set U = {i1, i2, · · · , iu} ⊆ S whose induced subgraph G|U
is acyclic. Hence, without loss of generality, we have
{i1, i2, · · · , ip−1} ⊆ Bip , ∀p ∈ [u]. (30)
Therefore, we have
g(S) ≥ g({i1, i2, · · · , iu})
= g(i1, i2, · · · , iu−1) +Riu
= g(i1, i2, · · · , iu−2) +Riu−1 +Riu
...
=
∑
p∈[u]
Rip = R · βMAIS(G|S),
where the inequality follows from (21), the equalities except
for the last one follow from (18) with (30), and the last
equality simply follows from the definition of u.
Proposition 3 and Lemma 1 can be trivially extended to the
secure index coding problem, based upon which we propose a
new performance bound, namely, the secure maximum acyclic
induced subgraph (S-MAIS) lower bound as follows.
Theorem 4: Consider a given secure index coding problem
(G,P) with g-partition N = {N1, N2, · · · , Nγ}. The S-
MAIS lower bound βS−MAIS(G,P) on its broadcast rate can
be constructed by the following steps:
1) For any subset Nk, k ∈ [γ], initialize ρNk as
ρNk = max
S∈Nk
βMAIS(G|S).
2) As long as there exist two g-subsets Nk, Nℓ, k 6= ℓ ∈
[γ−1] such that there exist some sets S ∈ Nk, S′ ∈ Nℓ
satisfying that S′ ⊆ S, and that
βMAIS(G|{j∈S\S′:S′⊆Bj}) + ρ
Nℓ > ρNk ,
update ρNk ← βMAIS(G|{j∈S\S′ :S′⊆Bj}) + ρ
Nℓ .
3) If no such Nk, Nℓ exist, set βS−MAIS(G,P) =
maxk∈[γ] ρ
Nk and terminate the algorithm.
Proof: We show that βS−MAIS(G,P) ≤ β(G,P), which
is equivalent to showing that 1 ≥ R · βS−MAIS(G,P) =
maxk∈[γ] ρ
Nk for any valid (t, r) secure index code and any
securely achievable symmetric rate R.
If maxk∈[γ] ρ
Nk = ρNγ , as ρNγ remains unchanged since
its initialization, we have
R · βS−MAIS(G,P) = R · ρ
Nγ = R · max
S∈Nγ
βMAIS(G|S)
≤ R · βMAIS(G) ≤ 1.
It remains to show that 1 ≥ R · βS−MAIS(G,P) when
βS−MAIS(G,P) = maxk∈[γ] ρ
Nk = ρNk for some k ∈
[γ − 1]. Recall that g(S) ≤ 1, ∀S ∈ N . We show that
1 ≥ R · βS−MAIS(G,P) by showing a slightly stronger
statement that
gNk ≥ R · ρ
Nk , ∀S ∈ Nk, k ∈ [γ − 1]. (31)
By induction, it suffices to show that
1) for the initialized ρNk = maxS∈Nk βMAIS(G|S), k ∈
[γ − 1], (31) holds;
2) for any Nk, Nℓ, k 6= ℓ ∈ [γ − 1] satisfying the
conditions in Step 2 in Theorem 4, the updated ρNk ,
which equals to βMAIS(G|{j∈S\S′ :S′⊆Bj}) + ρ
Nℓ for
some S ∈ Nk, S′ ∈ Nℓ, still satisfies (31), provided
that gNℓ ≥ R · ρ
Nℓ .
Consider the initialized ρNk = maxS∈Nk βMAIS(G|S), k ∈
[γ − 1]. By Theorem 2 and Lemma 1, we have
gNk ≥ R · βMAIS(G|S), ∀S ∈ Nk,
which directly leads to (31).
Consider any Nk, Nℓ, k 6= ℓ ∈ [γ−1] and S ∈ Nk, S′ ∈ Nℓ
satisfying the conditions in Step 2 in Theorem 4. The updated
ρNk = βMAIS(G|{j∈S\S′ :S′⊆Bj}) + ρ
Nℓ . Set
s = βMAIS(G|{j∈S\S′:S′⊆Bj}). (32)
Then, there exists some set {j1, j2, · · · , js} ⊆ {j ∈ S \ S′ :
S′ ⊆ Bj} whose induced subgraph is acyclic satisfying that
{j1, · · · , jp−1} ⊆ Bjp , ∀p ∈ [s]. (33)
Note that we also have
S′ ⊆ Bjp , ∀p ∈ [s], (34)
since any jp is an element of the set {j ∈ S \S
′ : S′ ⊆ Bj}.
Combining (33) and (34) we have
S′ ∪ {j1, · · · , jp−1} ⊆ Bjp , ∀p ∈ [s]. (35)
Hence, we have
gNk ≥ g(S
′ ∪ {j ∈ S \ S′ : S′ ∈ Bj})
≥ g(S′ ∪ {j1, j2, · · · , js})
= g(S′ ∪ {j1, j2, · · · , js−1}) +Rjs
= g(S′ ∪ {j1, j2, · · · , js−2}) +Rjs−1 +Rjs
...
= g(S′) +
∑
p∈[s]
Rjp
= gNℓ +R · βMAIS(G|{j∈S\S′:S′⊆Bj})
≥ R · (ρNℓ + βMAIS(G|{j∈S\S′:S′⊆Bj})) = R · ρ
Nk ,
where the first and second inequalities follow from (21), the
equalities except for the last two follow from (18) with (35),
the second last equality follows from (32), the last inequality
follows from the assumption that gNℓ ≥ R · ρ
Nℓ , and, finally,
the last equality follows from that the updated ρNk = ρNℓ +
βMAIS(G|{j∈S\S′ :S′⊆Bj}).
We state our second necessary condition for feasibility as
follows, which is based on Definition 1 and Theorem 4.
Theorem 5: Consider a given secure index coding problem
(G,P) with g-partition N = {N1, N2, · · · , Nγ}. The prob-
lem is infeasible if there exists some k ∈ [γ − 1] such that
ρNk > min
S∈Nk
|S |,
where ρNk , k ∈ [γ − 1] are iteratively defined by Steps 1-3
in Theorem 4.
Proof: Suppose for some k ∈ [γ − 1], we have ρNk >
minS∈Nk |S|. We show that the problem is infeasible by
contradiction. Assume that the problem is feasible with some
securely achievable symmetric rate R > 0. There exists some
S0 ∈ Nk such that |S0| = minS∈Nk |S|. Then, we have
g(S0) ≤
∑
i∈S0
g({i}) =
∑
i∈S0
Ri = R · min
s∈Nk
|S |, (36)
where the inequality follows from repeated application of
(22), and the second last inequality follows from (18). Hence,
R · min
S∈Nk
|S | ≥ g(S0)
= gNk ≥ R · ρ
Nk > R · min
S∈Nk
|S |, (37)
where the first, second, and the last inequality follow from
(36), (31), and the assumption that ρNk > minS∈Nk |S|, re-
spectively. Clearly, (37) leads to a contradiction, and therefore
the problem must be infeasible.
The following examples demonstrate the efficacy of Theo-
rems 4 and 5.
Example 3: Revisit the 9-message secure index coding
problem in Example 1. While the normal MAIS lower bound
gives β(G,P) ≥ βMAIS(G,P) = βMAIS(G) = 3, the S-MAIS
lower bound in Theorem 4 gives a strictly tighter result as
β(G,P) ≥ βS−MAIS(G,P) = 4 > 3.
That is, any securely achievable symmetric rate R ≤ 14 , which
matches the result in Example 1 and thus, establishes the
symmetric capacity to be 14 .
Example 4: Revisit the 5-message secure index coding
problem in Example 2, which is infeasible according to
Theorem 3. One can also see that the problem is infeasible
by Theorem 5 since for N5 ∈ N , ρN5 = 4, and thus
min
S∈N5
|S | ≤ |{3, 5}| = 2 < 4 = ρN5 .
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this work, we studied the secure index coding problem
with security constraints against receivers. We proposed a
linear coding scheme and two information-theoretic perfor-
mance bounds. We also developed two necessary conditions
for the existence of valid secure index codes that satisfy both
decoding and security requirements of all receivers.
A natural way to design more efficient coding schemes
for secure index coding is to adopt more powerful schemes
from the non-secure scenario. In particular, it has been
shown that the recursive codes [9] strictly outperforms the
FLPCC scheme and the non-linear enhanced composite cod-
ing scheme [13], [2, Appendix 6.C] strictly outperforms the
recursive codes. How to guarantee security for these coding
schemes remains to be investigated. As for the performance
bounds, a series of new bounds have been recently proposed
in [14], [15], which are strictly tighter than the MAIS bound
and not as computationally intensive as the more general
polymatroidal bound. Extending such bounds to secure index
coding could be an interesting direction for future study,
which may also lead to new feasibility check techniques.
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